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THE POLYGRAPH
does not alleviate one of the main objections to polygraph use by the
employer. As Congressman Cornelius Gallagher stated, "even if the
polygraph testing was trustworthy,
there is still no possible justification
'7 4
for such mental wire-tapping.

Possible vehicles for employee protection against polygraph testing
include "judicial recognition of the right of privacy, together with the
demise of the 'doctrine' of privilege in government employment and
the increasing recognition of the 'state action' elements involved in
Corporate enterprise. '75 The most effeotive method of protection,
however, would be through federal legislation which recognizes the
employee's right of privacy. In many states, it is certainly a needed
recognition and would indeed be a welcomed one.
VICTOR JEROME BOONE

Non-Renewal of Untenured Teacher's Contract: Cook v. Hudson
In Cook v. Hudson,' the court presented a somewhat unique
approach in interpreting the rights of untenured teachers. The court
in Cook upheld the school board's action in refusing to renew plaintiffs
one-year contract without giving them a hearing concerning their discharge. This note will analyze the meaning of Cook v. Hudson with
respect to the "subjective expectancy" of employment doctrine as it relates to public employees. Additionally the note will be concerned
with the effect of Cook on procedural rights of untenured teachers in
the light of Perry v. Sindermann2 and Roth v. Board of Regents.'
The litigation in Cook arose when the plaintiffs as teachers in the
Calhoun City, Mississippi refused to keep their children in the city
school system as required by the school board. The school board had
verbally adopted a policy in 1972, requiring new and existing teachers
living in the city to send their children to the public schools of the
county. The policy was established to prohibit public school teachers
from enrolling their children in racially discriminatory private schools.4
Although this policy was unwritten, it had been made known to the
teaching staff. Upon plaintiffs refusal to comply with the policy, the
74. House Rep't on Polygraphs.
75. HERMANN, at 154.
1. 365 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. Miss. 1973).
2. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).

3. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
4. 365 F. Supp. at 857.
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principal in April-May, 1973 did not recommend them for teaching
positions. Plaintiffs sued the school board, alleging they had been unconstitutionally discharged in violation of the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. The court held
Plaintiffs held one-year contracts which expired at the end of 197273 school year; they were not discharged during the school years. Although all of the plaintiffs had been employed in the Calhoun County
school system for several years, none had more than a "subjective expectancy" of re-employment generated by periods of employment
under5 those circumstances, it is settled that a hearing was not necessary.
BACKGROUND

Public employees fall into two categories with respect to retention
of their jobs. The first involves the employee whose position is protected by a statute which guarantees notice and hearing in the event
of nonretention.6 The second encompasses those who are not protected by such a statute. The latter's procedural rights are protected, if
at all, only by judicial enforcement. 7 Usually public school teachers'
tenure rights are protected by statute.8 Central to the tenure system
is the provision that a tenured teacher may discharged only "for
cause."9 While tenure may be attained in several ways, 10 it is normally
5. Mississippi does not have a tenure statute, however MCA § 37-9-25 provides for
contracts for principals or teachers for a period no greater than three years. The board
of trustees of any school district shall have the power and authority, in its discretion,
to elect the superintendent for not exceeding four scholastic years and the principals or
teachers for not exceeding three scholastic years. However, in Henry v. Coahoma
County Board of Education, 246 F. Supp. 517, aff'd 35 F.2d 648, cert. denied, 384 U.S.
962 (1966), the court decided that, where by law teachers contracts of employment were
made only for one year, and re-employment was conditional entirely upon the recommendation of the county superintendent of education, the fact that a teacher had been
previously employed for one year, or more than one year, gave her no right to employment during a succeeding school year.
6. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 71, 41 (1971); TENN. CODE ANN. 49-140z (Repl.
Vol. 1966).
7. See e.g., Pickering v. Board of Ed., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Drown v. Portsmouth
School Dist., 435 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 972 (1971). This
substantive constitutional protection is not affected by the presence or absence of state
tenure laws. Johnson v. Branch, 365 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1003 (1967).
8. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 71, 41 (1971); TENN. CODE ANN. 49-140z (Repl.
Vol. 1966).
9. "For cause" could include dismissal for insubordination, immoral character, conduct unbecoming a teacher, inefficiency, incompetency, physical or mental disability, or
neglect of duty. N.Y. ED. LAw § 3012(2) (McKinney 1970). Other statutes merely
refer to the lack of efficiency or good behavior. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 37.30
(Supp. 1971).
10. Since many states do not have tenure statutes, and most existing statutes only
protect public school teachers, tenure by contract is very important. Absent a tenure
statute, a teacher is limited to those substantive and procedural rights which are stated
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granted only after a probationary period of two to five years." The
teacher is also assured -that once charges are brought, he will have notice of their content and an opportunity to answer them at an administrative hearing.' 2 The nontenured public school teacher, however has
the same rights as those held by public employees unprotected by
statute.13
Though untenured teachers generally possess few, if any procedural
rights, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has extended their
rights by equating an "expectancy of employment" with tenure. 1 4 The
"expectancy of employment" was established by Judge Learned Hand
in Bomar v. Keyes.' 5 The Bomar case was concerned with the law
of torts, and did not present a constitutional question. Nevertheless,
the phrase was imbued in-to due process considerations by the Fifth Circuit which established the criteria of "expectancy of employment" as
the basis for entitlement to a statement of reasons and hearing in
1970.16 The concept was expanded by a later case to the determination that
"the substance of due process required that no instructor who has an
expectancy of continued employment be deprived of that expectancy
17
'by mere ceremonial compliance with due process.'
Various state statutory schemes have sought to strike a balance bein his contract. However, during the terms of the contract, a teacher, unless he or she
waives the right, may only be dismissed "for cause," just as under a tenure statute.
Parker v. Board of Ed., 237 F. Supp. 22, 226 (D. Md.), af'd 348 F.2d 464 (4th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1030 (1966). See Millar v. Joint School Dist. No. 2, 2,
86 N.W.2d 455 (1957).

See generally, Comment, Developments in the Law-Academic

Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1045, at 1099-1104 (1968).
11. See, e.g., N.Y. ED. LAW § 3012(1) (McKinney 1970) (three years probation);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 37-31 (Supp. 1971) (five year probation); but see, WASH. REV. CODE
§ 28A.67.070 (1970) (no probation).
12. Employees protected by statute must receive written notice stating the reasons
for dismissal and an opportunity to reply to the charges; 5 C.F.R. § 752.202 (1971).
Even where the statute itself does not provide for notice and hearing, the fact that removal is "for cause" implies such a result. Shurtlyf v. United States, 189 U.S. 311
(1903); Regan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419 (1901); Freeman v. Gould Special School
Dist., 405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969); Napolitano v. Ward,
317 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Winslow v. Minto, 164 Ore. 495, 192 P.2d 919
(1940).
13. Pickering v. Board of Ed., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); see, e.g., Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 435 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 972 (1971);
Freeman v. Gould School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 843
(1969) on the college level several universities recently have abolished tenure. NEWSWEEK, June 10, 1974 p. 75.
14. Lucas v. Chapman, 430 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1970). In that case the court held
that a nontenured teacher's long employment in a continuing relationship through the
use of renewals of short-term contracts was sufficient to give him the expectancy of reemployment necessary to construct a protectible interest. Id. at 947.
15. 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1947).
16. Pred. v. Bd. of Public Instruction, 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1970).
17. Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970).
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tween the teacher's interest in retaining his job of knowing the reasons
for his nonretention on the one hand, and the school board's interest
in having extensive discretion in rehiring or not rehiring probationary
teachers with a view toward maintaining a high quality faculty on the
other hand. Two questions arise. First, when and under what circumstances must a nonretained teacher be accorded a hearing or a statement of reason for dismissal; and second, when do the procedural
safeguards of due process of law attach as a right?
The "balancing of the interests" of the school board and the
employee was weighed in Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy.' 8
The case was concerned with a cook in a food concession on a military
installation who was denied a security clearance, thereby deprived of
access to her place of employment. 19 The court held that she was not
entitled to a hearing respecting the reasons for the denial of a security
clearance, thus depriving her of "the right to follow a chosen trade or
profession."2
The court, applying a balance test, concluded that her
interest in keeping one specific job was not sufficient to outweigh contravening governmental security interests. 2 '
This balancing test was emphasized in teaching nonretention cases
in three different circuits,2 2 with different results in each case. In Orr
v. Trinter,2 3 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a probationary teacher's interest in receiving a statement of reasons and a
hearing respecting his nonretention was outweighed by the school
board's interest in discretionary hiring practices. 24 In Drown v. Portsmouth School District,5 the First Circuit required a statement of reasons, but not a hearing. The court considered at 'length the competing
interests of 'the teachers and the school board. It noted that a statement of reasons could give the -teacher an opportunity to convince the
school board that its decision was based on mistaken facts, or it could
18. 367 U.S. 886 (1961).

19. Id. at 897-98.

20. Id. at 895-96. The Cafeteria Workers case represented a depa
. . U r..
. '

cision in Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).

-e

Where the court held that an aero-

nautical engineer was entitled to a full-blown hearing because "the revocation of security
clearance . . . has seriously affected, if not destroyed his ability to obtain employment

in the aeronautics filed."

Id. at 492.

21. 367 U.S. at 895-96. This balancing test requires that a determination of:
• . . what procedures due process may require under any given set of circum-

stances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government
fraction involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action. Id. at 895.
22. Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 408 U.S.
564 (1972); Orr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128, 135 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S.
943 (1972); Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 435 F.2d 1182, 1184-88 (1st Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 972 (1971).
23. 444 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 943 (1972).
24. 44 F.2d at 135.
25. 435 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 972 (1971).
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provide him with evidence that his dismissal was in violation of his constitutional rights. The statement could inform the teacher of his shortcomings for subsequent self-improvement. Moreover, the statement
could serve as a recommendation to a future employer, where for example, the state reasons cited the teacher as too innovative."' The
court concluded that the slight administrative burden imposed upon
the school board in furnishing a statement of reasons and affording the
teaching access to evaluation reports was outweighed by the enumerated
interests of the probationary teacher.27
While continuing to pursue the balance of interests, the court refused
to mandate a hearing. Administrators might be inclined to tolerate incompetent, or marginally competent teachers rather than encounter the
expense and discomfort of a hearing. The court also felt that administrators might be unwilling to hire innovative teachers who could be
the cause of future trouble.2" The court stated that although a
teacher's allegation of a violation of constitutional rights would not be
adequately answered by a statement of reasons, the teacher, unburdened by double hearings, would have adequate recourse to the federal
courts.2 9

The "balancing test" was examined in Roth v. Board of Regents"°
26. Id. at 1184-85.
27. See Frokt, Non-Tenure Teachers and the Constitution, 18 U. KAN. L. REV. 27,
at 28-32 (1969). The American Association of University Professors was concerned
that a nonretention notice with a statement of reasons would be confused with a dismissal for cause and erode the distinction between tenured and probationary teachers. Nevertheless, it "Concluded that the reasons in support of the faculty member's being informed outweigh the countervailing risks." COMMITTEE A ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND
TENURE, AMERICAN ASSN. OF UNIV. PROFESSORS PROCEDURAL STANDARDS IN THE RENEWAL OR NONRENEWAL OF FACULTY APPOINTMENTS, 56 A.A.UP. BULL. 21, 23 (1970).

28. 435 F.2d at 1186. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit expressed a similar concern that the requirement of a hearing "would nullify the probationary system,
whose purpose is to provide the school board a short-term test period during which the
fledgling teacher may be examined, evaluated, and if found wanting for any constitutional reasons, not rehired. Than v. Board of Pub. Instr., 432 F.2d 98, 100 (5th Cir.
1970); accord, Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806, 812 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd 408
U.S. 564 (1971); Orr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128, 134-35 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
408 U.S. 943 (1972); Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153, 1160 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 483 (1969); Note, Non-Tenure Teachers Procedural
Rights Upon Dismissal, 3 Loy. U.L.J. 114, at 131 (1972).
29. 435 F.2d at 1186-87. However, action subsequent to termination might be insufficient to protect the teacher's interests. See Van Alstyne, The ConstitutionalRights
of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DUKE L.J. 841, 858. Professor Van Alstyne thinks
that court litigation may be too costly for the individual teacher, and the slow process
of judicial proceedings may prevent the teacher, from resigning his duties at the same
institution since a final judgment may not be reached until years after the teacher has
been separated from his position. Id. at 859-60. However, precedent has been set for
a teacher to secure a temporary court injunction staying the nonretention until final
judgment in the 1983 action, Mailloux v. Kiley, 436 F.2d 565, 566 (lst Cir. 1971);
Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969); see also Note, HARV. L. REV. 1327,
1335 (1972).
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where the court agreed that the test required a hearing as well as a
statement of reasons. 3 ' The court further ruled that a nonretention decision could not be made on a "basis wholly unsupported in fact, or
on a basis wholly without reason. 2 Furthermore, the court suggested
as an additional reason for requiring a pre-termination hearing, that
"it serves as a prophylactic against nonretention decisions improperly
motivated by exercise of protected rights. ' 3
In several cases involving the rights of nontenured teachers, the
United State Supreme Court has ruled that generally a teacher cannot
be dismissed because of an exercise of constitutional rights.3 4 However, the teachers may be released if evidence shows that his comments
or actions substantially interfere with the orderly operation of the
school. A violation of this rule would give the teacher a right of
action. 3 5 The question remained, however, whether it would also entitle him to an administrative hearing as a right upon a mere allegation
of such a constitutional violation. 6
Perry v. Sindermann and Roth v. Board of Regents
The Sindermann and Roth decisions were the first cases in which
the Supreme Court examined the question of the re-employment rights
of probationary school teachers whose contracts were not renewed.
Sindermann,3 7 a companion case to Roth, presented the court with a
question concerning notice and hearing upon the state school's failure
to renew a nontenured teacher's employment contract. Sindermann
30. 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 408 U.S. 565 (1972).
31. Id. at 809.
32. Id. at 979. The court noted that the basis for dismissal did not have to be as
severe as the standard of "cause" for tenured teachers and the courts would "be bound
to respect bases for non-retention enjoying minimal factual support and bases for nonretention supported by subtle reasons." Id.
33. 446 F.2d at 810; ajj'd, Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939, 944 (5th Cir. 1970).
34. See Pickering v. Board of Ed., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents. 385 U.S. 58R9 (1Q67); -helton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, (1960); Slochower v.
Board of Higher Ed., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
The Shelton and Keyishian decisions were specifically concerned with the situation of
nontenured teachers whose contracts were not renewed because of their exercise of first
and fourteenth amendment rights.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides
Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities served by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proceedings for redress.
36. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 574 n.14 (dictum); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599 n.5 (dictum); see Van Alstyne, The Supreme Court and the
Nontentured: A Comment on Board of Regents v. Roth and Perry v. Sindermann, 58
A.A.U.P. BULL. 267 (1972).
37. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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had been employed at a state college for a period of ten years, all under
a series of one-year contracts. The Regents declined to renew his contract for the following year, without giving him a statement of reasons
for the action. He alleged that the nonrenewal was due to his public
criticism of the college administration. The Supreme Court affirmed
his claim to procedural due process after a reversal by the Court of Appeals, and held
The respondent alleged that the college had a de facto tenure pro-gram. . .based on rules and understanding, promulgated and fostered
by state officials . . . and he must be given an opportunity to prove
the legitimacy of his claim ... Such proof would obligate college offi-

cials to grant a hearing at his request, where he could be informed
8
of the grounds for his nonretention and challenge their sufficiencyA
The court acknowledged that in the companion case of Roth,3 9 that
a claimant's property interest may warrant a hearing. The court stated
Property interest are subject to due process protection if there are
such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim
40
of entitlement to the benefit and that he may invoke at a hearing.
The court went on to say that the claim of a mere subjective expectancy
was insufficient to require constitutional protection. However, the
teacher should be given an opportunity to prove the legitimacy of his
claim of such entitlement in light of the policies and practices of the
institution. 41 Thus the court answered the critical question of whether
the respondent's lack of a contractual or tenure right to re-employment,
taken alone, defeats his claim that the non-renewal of his contract violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment. Sindermann held that it
did not.

42

In Roth,4" a nontenured professor, contracted to teach at a state university for one year. During that year the president of the university
notified him that he would not be retained for the succeeding year. No
reasons were given nor was a hearing offered. The complaint alleged
that the university's action was taken in retaliation for the professor's
constitutionally protected expression of his opinions.
The court discarded or avoided the Cafeteria Workers balancing
test, 4 4 changing the emphasis from the relative weights of the interests
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 597-603 (1972).
408 U.S. at 577.
408 U.S. 601.
Id.
Id. at 601, 602.
408 U.S. 564.

44. i67 U.S. at 895-6. This balancing test requires that a determination of . . .
what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances
must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government fraction
involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental
action. Id. at 895.
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involved to the very nature of the interests themselves.45 Mr. Justice
Stewart reasoned that an individual is entitled to procedural due process
protection of his interests only if the interest is within the Fourteenth
Amendment's protection of "liberty and property."4' 6 A weighing of
interests would be appropriate only to determine the form of a hearing
once it has been determined that a hearing is required. 47 The court
then concluded that the plaintiffs interest in retention for the next
school year was neither a "liberty" nor a "property" right under the
Fourteenth Amendment. His liberty had not been infringed since he
suffered neither a serious attack on his reputation 48 nor a loss of subsequent employment opportunities.4 9 The Roth court did state however,
that one may be entitled to a hearing before a state can directly infringe
upon his first amendment interest.5"
In the Cook case, the court cited Sindermann as controlling, and
therefore, discharged the plaintiff's claim holding that five years of previous employment were less than "subjective expectancy,"5 1 and concluded that a hearing was unnecessary. 52 Apparently, the court overlooked Lucas v. Chapman.53 The court added that plaintiffs were advised of the reason for their nonretention and had every opportunity
to seek a hearing before the board if they desired one. Under Lucas
v. Chapman, a plaintiffs claim of denial of a constitutionally protected
right merits him a hearing by an administrative body. The court's construction in Cook was that plaintiffs were guilty of laches; they were
slothful in their failure to ask for a hearing before the board. The
question remains regarding whether a teacher should be apprised of
due process channels through which he may present his claim? Cook
does not require the school board to apprise the claimants that such
channels exist. The court acknowledged that the board did not make
express provisions for a hearing for any teacher affected by their
policy. 54 Minimum procedural due process requires a party to be put
on notice as to available opportunities to redress alleged grievances.1 5
in Cook, the court alludes to the difficult "ba-lancing V-finterests"
test: The teacher's interest in the exercise of his First Amendment
rights must be weighed against the state's interest in promoting the effi45. 408 U.S. at 570-571.
46. Id.

47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 570.
Id. at 573.
Id. at 573-74.
Id. at 575.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

365 F. Supp. 861.
Id.
430 F.2d at 947.
365 F. Supp. at 857.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
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cient dispensation of public services. The court cited Adler v. Board
of Education 6 as a basis for the theory that so long as the board's policy
is reasonable and constitutional, plaintiffs may not complain of being
released as public school teachers for having exercised their right to
send their children to a private school. However, both Roth5" and Sindermann5" allow a plaintiff to complain especially if a first amendment
right is alleged and the plaintiff has a "property interest." Lucas59 and
Sindermann60 gives more credence to "subjective expectancy" as being
a property right than does Cook.61
CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court confronted with the judicial and
academic controversy surrounding the non-renewal of nontenured
teachers, in Roth and Sindermann has responded by holding, that the
interest of the institution in staffing its facilities with a competent faculty deserves greater protection than do the individual teachers whose
contracts have been terminated. The decisions of the other courts, federal and state principally, within the Fifth Court Circuit are compatible
with this decision. Cook v. Hudson, while contrary to the general case
law in like situations is also compatible with several state laws. 62 The
effect of the decision should be tremendous regarding the non-renewal
of contracts of untenured teachers. At the public school level, Mississippi and its Fifth Circuit counterparts should fall within the ambit of
Roth. That case established that no right to a hearing or statement
automatically accrues because of the statutory provision for non-renewal. At the higher education level, the presence of a sufficient property interest to invoke due process considerations will depend on the
institution involved. Many institutions yet have some form of an explicit tenure system, though increasingly, others are relinquishing this
status.
Any future Fifth Circuit litigation on the question of due process rights
of nontenured teachers will center on the exceptions enunciated in the
Roth and Sindermann decisions. Perhaps, cases involving deprivation
of liberty should be handled on a case by case basis. Thus school officials can avoid needless litigation on such a question by (1) complying
with the applicable statutes or case law for non-renewal of contracts for
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

365 F. Supp. at 859.
408 U.S. at 573.
408 U.S. at 599.
430 F.2d 945.
408 U.S. 502.
365 F. Supp. 861.
Supra, note 7.
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public school teachers, and (2) avoiding any accusations against dismissed professors that would require later substantiation at a hearing.
CHARLES HOLMES

STATE v. DIX:

Common Law Kidnapping Requires A Substantial

Asportation and an Increased Risk of Harm*
The day after defendant escaped from a state prison camp he returned to a county jail to free three of his friends. He knocked on
the front door of the jail, and the assistant jailer opened it. Defendant
then pulled a gun on the jailer and threatened to kill him if he would not
release his companions. Holding the gun to the jailer's back, defendant
marched him from the jail vestibule, through his office, and down a
hall to a cell block which he compelled the jailer to open. After his
three "buddies" came out defendant forced the jailer into the cell. He
again threatened to kill the jailer, held the pistol to his head and pulled
the trigger, but the gun did not discharge. Defendant then withdrew, locked the cell block, and fled with his three companions. The
jailer was released nine minutes later by a trustee who heard his cries
for help. Defendant was convicted of kidnapping by the trial court.
The court of appeals, finding no error, affirmed. Held, reversed. Defendant's conduct in forcing the jailer to walk from the front door to
the cell, and in locking him inside, did not amount to asportation within
the common law definition of kidnapping. State v. Dix, 282 N.C. 490,
193 S.E.2d 897 (1973).
The n-t-n
presented to the North Carolina Supreme Court was
whether the jailer was "carried away" or "conveyed to some other
place" as these terms are used with reference to asportation as an element of kidnapping.' The majority stated that the "carrying away,
transportation, or asportation of the victim from the place where he is
seized to some other place is an essential element of common law kidnapping."' After reviewing past kidnapping cases from North Carolina
as well as other common law jurisdictions, they noted that every such
* By Alan M. Ahart. Mr. Ahart is a law student at the School of Law, State
University of New York at Buffalo and the Articles Editor of the Buffalo Law Review.
1. 282 N.C. 490, 494, 193 S.E.2d 897, 899 (1973).
2. Id.
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